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توضیحات

وبسایت مکاله اقدام به ارائه پروژه ی ساینس دایرکت با فرمت pdf، از انتشارات الزویر برای رشته بازاریابی، و با عنوان اثرات عدم چانه زدن در استراتژی های بازاریابی، نموده است. 


مشخصات این مقاله :

عنوان مقاله :

The effects of a “no-haggle” channel on marketing strategies

ترجمه فارسی عنوان :

اثرات عدم چانه زدن در استراتژی های بازاریابی

سال انتشار : 2014

متعلق به مجله یا ژورنال : نشریه بین المللی تحقیقات بازاریابی Intern. J. of Research in Marketing

فرمت: PDF

تعداد صفحات: 10

شماره پروژه: 5066


کلمات کلیدی :

Channel relationships, Pricing, Bargaining

روابط کانال، قیمت گذاری، چانه زنی


چکیده  :

Abstract

As sellers increasingly turn tomulti-channel retailing, the opportunity to implement different pricing policies has grown. With the advent of the internet, many traditionally bargained products such as automobiles, jewelry, watches, appliances and furniture are now being offered online at a fixed pre-determined price. We explore the strategy of simultaneously offering two pricing formats (fixed and bargained) via two different channels (online and brick and mortar) and find that in a market where there are two types of consumers—those with a high cost of haggling and others with a lower cost—a dual-pricing strategy is optimal onlywhen there are enough high haggling-cost consumers, but not too many, and when the haggling costs between the two types of consumers are sufficiently different. We also find that it is optimal for the seller to specify a higher-than-cost minimum acceptable price as the price floor of bargaining. By doing so, the seller increases the bargained price by complementing the salesperson’s bargaining ability, and also softens the internal competition between the two channels. Finally, we find that, surprisingly, the dual-pricing strategy may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single price structure. The implications for consumer surplus are also explored.


مقدمه این مقاله :

 Introduction

In many markets, bargaining is the norm. In the automobile market, consumers only infrequently pay the sticker price for a car. For products such as electronics, jewelry and furniture, while bargaining is not as overt as in the car market, consumers still expect to be able to haggle with salespeople, either directly on the sales price of the product or on service-related costs: chain retailers such as Best Buy and Sleep Country routinely bargainwith in-store customers by offering themin-store discounts as well as additional services such as free delivery and extended warranties.With the advent of the internet and the growing popularity of online buying, however, many manufacturers and retailers are now offering their products at fixed prices either through their own websites or third party sites, ostensibly addressing some consumers’ dissatisfaction with bargaining and time spent visiting the physical store (Business Week, 2007). In the automobile market, third-party websites such as www.CarsDirect.com, www.Autobytel.com and the Canadian website www.unhaggle.com allow consumers to obtain price quotes (typically provided by several competing dealers) for the car of their choice. Consumers simply review the price and, if acceptable, the car is shipped to them directly. Best Buy and other large retailers continue to allow bargaining on the shop floor even though the prices on their websites are fixed.1 High end stores, such as Cartier and Zales for jewelry and Ethan Allen for furniture, have recently introduced online shopping that, like the online auto-buying websites, allow consumers to avoid haggling and visiting the physical store. In some cultures, such as in Asia, where haggling is traditional even for small-ticket items including clothing, food and home appliances, the growing use of the internet has led to many retailers launching their own web-stores or joining online aggregators such as Taobao (China’s leader in e-commerce),where typically prices are fixed and cannot be bargained over. Despite the growing opportunity for sellers to usemulti-channel settings to simultaneously implement different pricing policies, there is significant variation across and within industries in the extent to which this strategy has been adopted, for which the extant literature does not provide a satisfactory explanation. There have been numerous studies examining a seller’s choice between a fixed-price format and a bargaining format (e.g., Riley & Zeckhauser, 1983;Wang, 1995; Arnold & Lippman, 1998), all of which focus on a seller’s choice of one pricing format over another and do not consider the possibility that the seller may want to offer both simultaneously.

 


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