دانلود مقاله isi مدیریت درآمد کسب و کار : محرک های مالیاتی یا استملاک پنهان؟
دانلود رایگان مقاله الزویر در مورد مدیریت درآمد کسب و کار : محرک های مالیاتی یا استملاک پنهان؟ (کلیک کنید)
توضیحات :
وبسایت مکاله اقدام به ارائه پروژه ی ساینس دایرکت با فرمت pdf، از انتشارات الزویر برای رشته حسابداری، و با عنوان مدیریت درآمد کسب و کار : محرک های مالیاتی یا استملاک پنهان؟، نموده است.
مشخصات این مقاله :
عنوان مقاله :
Earnings Management in Business Groups: Tax Incentives or Expropriation Concealment?
ترجمه فارسی عنوان :
مدیریت درآمد کسب و کار : محرک های مالیاتی یا استملاک پنهان؟
سال انتشار : 2014
متعلق به مجله یا ژورنال : مجله بین المللی حسابداری -The International Journal of Accounting
فرمت: PDF
تعداد صفحات: 26
شماره پروژه: 2058
کلمات کلیدی :
Business groups, Earnings management, Marginal tax rate, Ownership structure
گروه کسب و کار، مدیریت درآمد، نرخ نهایی مالیات، ساختار مالکیت
چکیده :
Abstract
This study provides evidence that Belgian firms affiliated to a business group (holding) manage their earnings more than stand-alone firms. Earnings management is especially more prevalent in fully owned group firms compared to group firms with minority shareholders. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling shareholders face fewer constraints to manage earnings if opportunistic earnings management cannot adversely affect the value of minority shareholders and is inconsistent with the claim that group firms would engage in earnings management to hide controlling shareholders’ self-serving transactions.On the incentive part, we find that group firms strategically manage earnings in response to tax incentives. More specifically, we show that signed discretionary accruals of group firms depend significantly more on the marginal tax rate status of the firm as compared to independent firms. Finally, we document that earnings management is particularly facilitated through intra-group transactions.
مقدمه این مقاله :
Introduction
In this study, we examine the effect of business group affiliations on earnings management decisions.While prior literature typically explains earnings management in business groups as a way to disguise value expropriation at the expense of minority shareholders (e.g., Gordon & Henry, 2005; Kim & Yi, 2006), we evaluate the importance of an alternative motivation,
namely taxation. We define business groups as the network of parent and subsidiary firms structured in holding groups. In a typical holding, the parent firm is explicitly organized for the purpose of owning a controlling interest in other firms which then de jure become the holding firm’s subsidiaries. Holdings have been dominant in many economies worldwide and have
been disputed for their opaque ownership structures as well as applauded for their economic purposes (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006).1 Holding group membership may yield a number of benefits for the parent as well as for affiliated firms. First, parent companies do not need to obtain 100%share ownership for taking control, thereby reducing the minimum investment needed to obtain control over a subsidiary compared to a typical M&A transaction. Also, parent companies can expand their debt capacity since shares of stock in subsidiaries are recorded as parent-level assets and treated as collateral in loan agreements. Relying on the extended debt capacity of the parent, holding subsidiaries can rely on internal capital markets to finance their activities, which make them potentially less dependent on external financiers than stand-alone firms (Claessens et al., 2006;Gramlich, Limpaphayom, & Ghon Rhee, 2004). From a management perspective,decentralized management and cross-pollination between professional group staff services are seen as additional advantages of business groups (Banerjee, Leleux, & Vermaelen, 1997).
Holdings provide another set of features, however, that are particularly interesting from a group perspective. First, holdings are typically structured through a myriad of complicated networks, which provide group members with substantial discretionary tools and flexibility to manage earnings through related-party transactions. As a consequence, holdings may have
more tools as well as more opportunities to manage earnings compared to stand-alone firms (Jian & Wong, 2010). Furthermore, holdings are potentially appealing from a tax-minimizing perspective in that losses of one subsidiary can be used to offset profits from another subsidiary, thereby reducing the overall taxes paid.
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