دانلود رایگان مقاله الزویر در مورد تاثیر مشاوران مورد اعتماد در فرایند جانشینی کسب و کار خانواده (کلیک کنید)
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مشخصات این مقاله :
عنوان مقاله :
Trusted advisors in a family business’s succession-planning process—An agency perspective
ترجمه فارسی عنوان :
تاثیر مشاوران مورد اعتماد در فرایند جانشینی کسب و کار خانواده- برنامه ریزی چشم انداز سازمان
سال انتشار : 2015
متعلق به مجله یا ژورنال : مجله استراتژی کسب و کار خانوادگی-Journal of Family Business Strategy
تعداد صفحات: 13
شماره پروژه: 5122
کلمات کلیدی :
Family business,Trusted advisor,Succession planning,Agency theory
کسب و کار خانواده، مشاور مورد اعتماد، برنامه ریزی جانشینی،نظریه سازمان
Family business succession is a complex and challenging process, in which family members often build on the support of trusted advisors who can be seen as the most relied external source of advice and knowledge that family businesses draw on. Based on an extensive literature review, this article aims to synthesize prior research on both advisors and succession to systematically describe and analyze the role of trusted advisors during the succession-planning process. Based on arguments from agency theory, we discuss potential benefits and drawbacks associated with the involvement of trusted advisors along the four phases—trigger, preparation, selection, and training—of the succession-planning process and outline how trusted advisors can mitigate but also enhance agency costs—in particular goal divergence and information asymmetry—during each of these four phases. Subsequently, we discuss four typical constellations of advisor involvement, which vary in their agency costs and thus have different levels of bias and efficiency. We thereby outline several inefficiencies that result from the common setup in which an incumbent and a successor both rely on their own trusted advisors or a team of expert advisors and propose a balanced and efficient model of advisor involvement as a potential solution which reduces the agency costs. This conceptual article contributes to research on succession, agency theory, and trusted advisors in family firms.
مقدمه این مقاله :
Family business succession is a crucial and in many cases long lasting process that may absorb the attention and resources of a family for years (Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, & Garcia-Almeida,2001). Numerous examples around the world show that succession is also a challenging process that many businesses struggle with (Mussolino & Calabro` , 2014), in particular with defining the right timing, finding the right successor, and managing the succession process in a fortunate way (Sharma, 2004).In light of the challenges that arise during the succession process, researchers and practitioners have recently started to point to the crucial role played by trusted advisors in the succession process (e.g., Strike, 2012). Trusted advisors are defined as the most-relied external source of business advice for members of family businesses, including, for instance, lawyers, accountants, and consultants with whom family members have enjoyed long-lasting professional relationships (LaChapelle & Barnes, 1998; Nicholson, Shepherd, & Woods, 2010). On the one hand, trusted advisors are
expected to provide important capabilities such as expert knowl- edge and high-quality feedback and thus improve the quality of family members’ decisions, the strategic planning process, and ultimately the firm’s performance (Davis, Dibrell, Craig, & Green,2013; Reay, Pearson, & Dyer, 2013; Strike, 2012). In particular,trusted advisors can improve the efficacy of the succession process by mentoring both incumbents and successors, providing new insights on the succession (Salvato & Corbetta, 2013), or acting as agents to bring different opinions together and achieve compromise solutions (Lane, Astrachan, Keyt, & McMillan, 2006; Thomas, 2002). However, trusted advisors are also associated with possible costs and drawbacks, stemming from agency costs, particularly those costs that result from divergent goals (e.g., Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2004a, 2004b) and informational asymmetries (e.g., Dehlen,Zellweger, Kammerlander, & Halter, 2014) between the incumbent, the successor, and the advisor.
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در این مقاله خواهید خواند که جانشینی کسب و کار خانواده یک فرایند پیچیده و چاش برانگیز است. همچنین این مقاله به پژوهش در زمینه جانشینی ، تئوری نمایندگی و مشاوران مورد اعتماد در شرکت های خانوادگی می پردازد.