دانلود مقاله isi مطالعه اکتشافی درباره کشف مدیریت درآمد


دانلود رایگان مقاله الزویر در مورد یک مطالعه اکتشافی از کشف مدیریت درآمد ها، پوشش تحلیلگر و تاثیر تصویب IFRS (کلیک کنید)


 

توضیحات

وبسایت مکاله اقدام به ارائه پروژه ی ساینس دایرکت با فرمت pdf، از انتشارات الزویر برای رشته حسابداری، و با عنوان یک مطالعه اکتشافی از کشف مدیریت درآمدها، پوشش تحلیلگر و تاثیر تصویب IFRS: شواهدی از چین، نموده است. 


مشخصات این مقاله :

عنوان مقاله :

An exploratory study of earnings management detectability, analyst coverage and the impact of IFRS adoption: Evidence from China

ترجمه فارسی عنوان :

یک مطالعه اکتشافی از کشف مدیریت درآمدها، پوشش تحلیلگر و تاثیر تصویب IFRS: شواهدی از چین

سال انتشار : 2014

متعلق به مجله یا ژورنال : مجله حسابداری و سیاست های دولتی (Journal of Accounting and Public Policy)

فرمت: PDF

تعداد صفحات: 16

شماره پروژه: 5029


چکیده  :

Abstract

Analysts serving as external monitors to managers is a topic of considerable interest in the analyst coverage literature. There are two outcomes of analyst coverage studies: curbing and stimulating earnings management. However, recent studies (such as Yu, 2008) only provide evidence supporting the curbing side. Given the fact that the data of these studies focus on developed markets and the finding of Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010) that external governance mechanisms may stimulate earnings management in an opaque information environment, we conjecture whether stimulating side would be dominant in emerging markets. China offers a valuable setting for us to test the question. Using the data of China capital market from 2003 to 2009, we find that analyst coverage stimulates earnings management through above-the-line items (ALIs) where earnings management cannot be easily detected, and curbs earnings management through below-the-line items (BLIs) where earnings management can be easily detected. We also find that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in China does create many new opportunities for managers’ earnings management but does not significantly improve the monitoring effect of analyst coverage. We only find that compared to those without analyst coverage, firms with analyst coverage have a lower level of earnings management through BLIs after IFRS adoption. These findings suggest that information opacity may weaken the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms and high quality accounting standards in the literal sense may not enhance the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms if it is not compatible with the market’s institutional environment. In addition, we find that firms with earnings meeting the benchmark have a lower level of earnings management, which indicates that brightline accounting based rules used in emerging capital markets may constrain the managers’ behavior.


مقدمه این مقاله :

 Introduction

Existing research (such as Yu, 2008) on the effects of analyst coverage on earnings management (EM) with accruals argues that there are two possible effects: monitoring effect (i.e., curbing earnings management) and pressure effect (i.e., stimulating earnings management). Because analysts per se  function as one of the external corporate governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lang et al., 2004; Yu, 2008), analyst coverage is intended to scrutinize firm behavior and discipline the earnings management behavior of managers. Numerous studies have  shown that analyst coverage has achieved their intended objective of curbing earnings management (Degeorge et al., 2005; Knyazeva, 2007; Yu, 2008; Sun, 2009).
Nevertheless, through covering firms, analysts usually release earnings forecast reports, which may set a target for managers and create excessive pressure on managers. To achieve the target, managers may try to meet or beat analysts’ forecast consensus through earnings management (Degeorge et al., 1999; Degeorge et al., 2005; Yu, 2008). Furthermore, there are many other factors such as the situation of analysts themselves under pressure (Yu, 2008), or the opaque information environment (Rodríguez- Pérez and Hemmen, 2010) that may affect analysts’ role in governance. However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies have documented empirical evidences for the pressure effect, i.e., unintended consequences of analyst coverage. As Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010) find that external governance mechanisms may stimulate earnings management in an opaque information environment, would pressure effect of analyst coverage be dominant in opaque information environments?


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دانلود رایگان مقاله الزویر در مورد یک مطالعه اکتشافی از کشف مدیریت درآمد ها، پوشش تحلیلگر و تاثیر تصویب IFRS (کلیک کنید)


 

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